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v. CijARENOE HERDA,
[1] Divorce-Permanent
of Agreement of Parties.
-Husband and wife made provisions for support and maintenance an integral part of their
settlement agreement where they clearly
their purpose to settle
their rights in all Tespeets
as otherwise provided, where
the wife accepted the
for her in full satisfaction
of her right to the
property and of her right to
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children,
and where the husband
to pay her a designated sum
per month for such support and maintenance, and the fact
that the amount of existing
and the amount that
otherwise accrue
termination of the
was speculative did not detract from the
spouses' clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to
fix the amount of
payments.
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.It is not significant that the amount
on for support
and maintenance of the wife and minor children in a property
settlement agreement was the same that the husband had been
paying the wife following their
but before the
agreement was executed the
to an amount that could not he
during the minority
of the children or increased unless the welfare of the children
so required.
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termination.-Where there was no express provision in a property
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
2] Divorce, § 203; [3, 4] Divorce,
§ 214; [5] Divorce, § 216(5); [6] Divorce, § 180(4).
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in a 1938 divorce decree that
~mw>~wr. should termiand no express
that they
death, the insignificant amount of the
Twonrq•tv involved
the conclusion that by
necessary
the
attributable to the wife's
support should terminate on her
just as those attributable to the support of the children terminate on their
reaching their majority.
[ 4] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termination.-The conclusion that payments provided for the support
and maintenance of the wife in a property settlement agreement ineorporated in a divoree deeree should terminate on the
wife's remarriage, based either on an express provision to that
effect or inferred from the provisions of the agreement as a
whole, does not conflict with the conclusion that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are not otherwise subject to modification; it would be unreasonable to conclude
that the payment should continue for the wife's benefit after
the obligation to support the children had terminated on their
reaching their majority and the obligation of her support had
been assumed by her second husband.
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Hearing
and Determination of Motion.-An order denying a motion to
have payments for the support and maintenance of a former
wife and minor children reduced on the grounds that the wife
had remarried and that one of the children was about to enter
the armed services was not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding to have the payments terminated on the ground that
the wife had remarried and both children had reached their
majority where, at the time of the previous modification proceedings, neither child had reaehed his majority and it could
not be determined whether denial of the motion was based
on a determination that the wife's remarriage was immaterial
or on continuing need of the full amount for the children's
support, care and education.
[6] Id.-Counsel Fees.-Where a property settlement agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree specifically provided that the
husband should indemnify the wife for all costs and attorney's
fees in defending any motion or proceeding affecting the agreement, and did not make her right to such fees dependent on
her inability to pay them, the trial court erred in denying her
prayer therefor on the ground that she had not shown such
inability.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County terminating support payments under a divorce

:2:l0

HERDA

v.

HERDA

judgment. Murray Draper, ,Judge.
and reversed in part.

[48 C.2<1

Order affirmed in part

Henry W. Schaldach for .Appellant.
Chas. E. R. Fulcher for Respondent.
'riL'\ YNOR, ,I.--Plaintiff and defendant were married in
J 92;) alHl separated in 1937. On Marrh 1, 1988, they executed
a property settlement agreement. It recited that owing to
disputes and differences between them the parties had agreed
to live separate and apart and that it was their "mutual wish
and desire . . . that a full and final adjustment of all their
property rights, interests and claims be had, settled and determined by said parties in this Agreement, including custody
and maintenam~e of the [two] minor rhildren of said parties.''
It provided :
"Now THERE~'ORE, it is agreed in consideration of the
mutual promises, agreements, and covenants contained herein,
it is covenanted, agreed, and promised by each party hereto,
to and with the other party hereto, as follows:
''FIRST: 'l'hat, except as hereinafter specified, each party
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obligations and liabilities for the future acts and duties of the
other, and that ear.h of said parties hereby releases the other
from any and all liabilities, debts or obligations of any kind
or character inenrrecl by the other from and after this date,
and from any aud all claims and d(~mands, including all claims
of either party upon the other for support and maintenance
as wife or husband or otherwise, it being understood that
this instrument is intended to settle the rights of the parties
hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided. . . .
"FIFTH : l Plaintiff] does and shall aecept the provisions
herein made for her in full satisfaction of her right to the
community property of the respective parties hereto, and in
full satisfaction of hrr right to snpport and maintenance, and
for the support and maintenance of said minor children as
herein provided.''
Provisions were then made for the division of the property.
Plaintiff received household personal property and defendant
received an automobile. A life insurance policy on defendant's life 1vas assigned to plaintiff and defendant agreed to
keep the policy in force. It was further agreed that plaintiff
should have custody of the minor children and be entitled
to take them out of the state.
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Paragraph eight provided that "The husband agrees in
consideration of the premises and mutual covenants and agreements herein contained to pay to the wife the sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month as and for the
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children
of said parties, said payments to commence on March 1, 1938
and to continue monthly thereafter on the first (1st) day of
each and every month thereafter." It also provided that
defendant should pay certain debts and plaintiff's moving
expenses should she decide to leave the state.
On March 18, 1938, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on
the grounds of extreme cruelty. She attached a copy of
the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it he approved and made a part of the decree by reference. On
April 18th she secured an interlocutory decree of divorce,
which approved the agreement and incorporated it in its
entirety by reference. It also provided that "IT Is FuRTHER
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant be, and he
hereby is, required to pay to plaintiff herein, as and for her
support and the support, care and education of the minor
children of said parties, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($250.00) per month, which said payments to commence March 1, 1938, and continue monthly hereafter on
the 1st day of each and every month."
A final decree of divorce was entered in 1939, and plaintiff
remarried in 1943. In 1944 defendant moved to have the
payments reduced on the grounds that plaintiff had remarried
and that one of the children was about to enter the armed
services, but his motion was denied. In 1954 he moved to
have the payments terminated on the ground that plaintiff
had remarried and both the children had reached their majority. Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees to resist defendant's motion, and following a hearing the court ordered that
the interlocutory and final decrees ''be modified by terminating all payments for the support of the plaintiff and for
the support, care and education of the minor children of the
parties hereto forthwith." It also ordered that no counsel
fees be allowed for plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff appeals.
She contends that the proYision for monthly payments was
an integral and inseparable part of the property settlement
agreement of the parties and that therefore the amount of
the payments attributable to her cannot be reduced because
of her remarriage. She also contends that the order denying
modification in 1944 is res judicata in her favor. Defendant

232

HERDA

v.

HERDA

[48 C.2d

contends,
for
payments
\Yas a provision for
to section 139 of the Civil
Code and that even if it constitutes an
and inseparable part of the property settlement
his obligations thereunder terminated after
remarried and the
children reached their majority. He also contends that the
1944 order is not res
on the
that it may
have been based on
need of the full amount for the
support, care, and education of the
who were then
still minors.
In Messenger v.
46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d
988], we held that when "the
have clearly expressed
their 'purpose of fixing and
their personal and
property rights,' have provided that the provision for alimony
is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting
division and settlement of all their
rights of every
kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to future
maintenance and support . . . ,
as herein otherwise
expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they
have made the provisions for support and maintenance an
integral and inseparable
of their property settlement
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, the
provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would be
subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided." (Accord: Andm·son v. lf!lart, 47 Cal.2d 274, 279
[303 P.2d 539] .) [1] It is clear from the provisions of the
agreement quoted above, that the agreement in the present
case falls squarely within the foregoing rule. The parties
stated their intention to settle both their property and support and maintenance rights, and the fact that the amount of
existing community property was small and the amount that
might otherwise accrue before the termination of the marriage
was speculative, in no way detracts from their clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to fix and determine
the amount of the payments thereafter. [2] Similarly, it
is not significant that the amount agreed upon was the same
amount defendant had been paying plaintiff following their
separation bnt before the agreement was exeeuted. In the
absenee of the agreement, that amount might or might not
have been aecepted by the court as appropriate for alimony
and ehild support and it could have been modified in the
event of ehanged circumstances. The parties were entitled to
agree to an amount that could not be decreased during the
minority of the children or increased unless the welfare of
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Dexter, 42 Cal.2d
the children so
36, 43 [265 P.2d
v.
supra, 46 Cal.
2cl 619, 627-628 Anderson v. lYlart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274,
281.)
[3] The question remains whether the agreement may
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plaintiff's support following her
In Anderson v. Mart,
supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees
entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, payments
pursuant thereto do "not terminate on the death of the
husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement
so provided. [Citations.]" (See also Taliaferro v. Taliaferr·o, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036] .) In the
present case there is no express provision that the payments
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her
remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that
they should continue until her death. Under these circumstances we have concluded that the insignificant amount of
the community property involved in the agreement justifies
the conclusion that by necessary implication the payments
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her
remarriage just as the payments attributable to the support
of the children terminate on their reaching their majority.
In Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873],
the court stated that when "the parties have made the provision for support and maintenanee an integral part of their
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they
arc designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.)
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a
division of the eommunity property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the terms of the property settlement
agreement of the parties." It was therefore held in the Dexter
case that a provision that the payments should terminate on
the remarriage of the wife did not indicate that the monthly
payments provided in an integrated agreement were for alimony. [4] It is thus clear that the conclusion that the
payments should so terminate, based either on an express
provision to that effect or inferred from the provisions of
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the agreement as a whole, does not conflict with the conclusion
that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are
not otherwise subject to modification. Since the agreement in the present case dealt primarily with support rights
and the payments were described as for support and maintenance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the payments should continue for
plaintiff's benefit after the obligation to support the children
had terminated (see Anderson v. JJia1·t, supra, 47 Cal.2d
274, 283, and cases cited) and the obligation of plaintiff's
support had been assumed by her second husband. Harnden v.
Harnden, 102 Cal.App.2d 209 [227 P.2d 51], Lane v. Bradley,
124 Cal.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092], and Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419 [270 P.2d 1036], are not contrary
to our conclusion herein since in those cases the agreements
either expressly provided when the payments should terminate
or involved the settlement of substantial property rights.
[5] At the time of the previous modification proceedings
neither child had reached his majority and it cannot be determined from the record whether the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to reduce the payments was based on a
determination that plaintiff's remarriage was immaterial or
was based on continuing need of the full amount for the
support, care, and education of the children. Since the children have now reached their majority, the circumstances have
materially changed since the entry of that order, and plaintiff has failed to prove that it was based on a determination
of the issue now before us. Accordingly, it is not res judicata.
(Ihtrd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 26 [3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R. 1348] ;
Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 460 [194 P. 34]; Emerson v. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal. 50, 57 [85 P. 122] ;
Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [230 P.2d 667].)
[6] Paragraph ten of the agreement provides in part that
defendant agrees to ''pay and indemnify the wife for all
expenses, costs and attorney's fees in defending any suit,
motion or proceeding· brought by the husband or anyone in
his behalf in any manner affecting this Agreement, and the
wife's right thereto in any respect whatsoever." Since this
provision does not make plaintiff's right to attorney's fees dependent on her inability to pay them, the trial court erred
in denying her prayer therefor on the ground that she had
not shown such inability.
The order is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff's motion

Mar. 1957]

HERDA

v.

HERDA

[48 C.2d 228; 308 P.2d 705]

for an award of attorney's fees.
affirmed.

In all other respects it is

Gibson, C. ,J., Spence, ,T., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTEH, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment of affirmance. I do not, however, agree with the
majority in its reliance on the cases of Dexter v. Dexter, 42
Cal.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d
619 [297 P.2d 988], and Anderson v. JJJart, 47 Cal.2d 274
[303 P.2d 539]. I express no approval of the law as set forth
in the above mentioned cases. In the Dexter and Messenger
cases the court was concerned chiefly with the character of
the payments provided for in the property settlement agreement and whether or not such payments constituted such an
integral part of the agreement as to prevent a subsequent
modification thereof.
Anderson v. "~[art, supm, has some analogy to the case at
bar. In that case plaintiff's former husband died. The agreement there contained no provision that the monthly payments
Rhould cease on plaintiff's remarriage, or the attainment of
majority by the parties' child, or the death of the payor. In
the ease at bar, the agreemrnt likewise contained no provision
for termination of the monthly payments by remarriage of the
payee, majority of the children, or death of the payor. Both
the Anderson case and the case at bar involvrd agreements
rntered into prior to the 1951 amendment of section 139 of
the Civil Code. The section as it read prior to the amendmrnt provided that "Upon the remarriage of the wife, the
husband shall no longer be obligated to provide for her
support but such remarriage shall not affect his duty to provide for the maintenance of the children of his marriage.''
The 1951 amendment provided that "Except as otherwise
agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the death of
the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other party."
The trial court in the Anderson case held that the payor's
rstate was indebted to plaintiff (his former wife) on the property settlement agreement and that the "agreemrnt was incorporated in and made a part of the deeree in the divorce
action and that the provision for support therein was an
inseparable part of an integrated property settlement agreement and therefore entered judgm(mt for plaintiff for $14,190
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to be paid out of the funds of the estate m due course of
administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy."
(47 Cal.2d 274, 277, 278 [303 P.2d 539].) A majority of
this court held that the trial court properly allowed plaintiff
to recover from her former husband's estate "the amount
attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of her
life expectancy." The conclusion was reached by reasoning
that the support payments were not separable from the balance
of the agreement and that the waiver provisions did not prevent plaintiff from enforcing the agreement as made. A majority also held that the agreement in the Anderson case
fell ''squarely within the . . . rule'' of the Messenger case.
In the case at bar, where the majority reach an entirely
different result, it is also held that the agreement "in the
present case falls squarely within the . . . rule" of the
Messenger case. That rule is that when "the parties have
clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their
personal and property rights,' have provided that the provision for alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of every kind and nature,' and the wife has
waived 'all right to future maintenance and support . . .,
except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions
for support and maintenance an integral and inseparable
part of their property settlement agreement. With such
conclusive evidence of integration, the provisions for support
and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided.'' ( 4() Cal.2d
619, 628 [297 P.2d 988] .) Despite the fact that the agreement
here contained no provision of any kind for termination of
the monthly payments the majority holds that such payments terminated upon the remarriage of the wife and the
attainment of majority by the children. It is noted, inter
alia, in the majority opinion that there was here "no express
provision that they [the payments] should continue until
her [plaintiff's 1 death." There was also no such provision
in the Anderson case agreement.
The reasoning of the majority in the present case and
the result reached by it appear to me to be inconsistent. In
the first instance the Messenger rule is relied upon and it
is also said that "The parties stated their intention to settle
both their property and support and maintenance rights, and
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the fact that the amount of
community property was
small and the amount that might otherwise accrue before the
termination of the
was speculative, in no way
detracts from their
intention, as between
themselves, to fix and determine the amount of the payments
thereafter. Similarly, it is not significant that the amount
agreed upon was the same amount defendant had been
paying plaintiff following their separation but before the
was executed. In the absence of the agreement,
that amount might or might not have been accepted by the
eourt as appropriate for alimony and child support and it
t·ould have been modified in the event of changed circumstances. 'fhe parties vYere entitled to agree to an amount
that could not be decreased during the minority of the children or iucreased unless the welfare of the children so required." 'fhe majority, having coneluded that this was an
integrated, inseparable property settlement agreement, then
~tated: "The question remains whether the agreement may
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plaintiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart,
sttpra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case
of intpgrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139,
payments pursuant thereto do 'not terminate on the death
of the husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement so provided. [Citations.]' (See also Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036] .) In
the present case there is no express provision that the payments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on
her remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that they should continue until her death. Under
these circumstances we have conclttded that the insignificant
amount of the community prope1·ty 1:nvolvcd in the agreement
justifies the conclusion that by necessm·y implication the
pa.yments attr·ibutable to plaintiff's support shmtld terminate
on her remarriage j?tst as the payments attrib1dable to the
support of the children terminate on their 1·eaching their majority." (Emphasis added.) On just what reasoning this
conclusion is based escapes me. If the monthly payments are
an integrated part of the property settlement agreement
and the parties agreed that the wife would receive $250 per
month without express provision for the termination thereof
on her remarriage, how can it be concluded that her remarriage terminated such payments in view of the reliance
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by the majority on the Anderson case? The code draws
no distinction betwern rf'marriagc of the wife and the death
of the payor.
The majority next quotes from the case of Dexter v. Dexter,
42 Cal.2d 36, 41, 42 [265 P .2d 873], to the effect that monthly
payments in a property settlement agreement "will ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they are
designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.]
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a
division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified
without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties.'' The majority then notes: ''It was
therefore held in the Dexter ease that a provision that the
payments should terminate on the remarriage of the wife did
not indicate that the monthly payments provided in an
integrated agreement were for alimony. It is thtts clear that
the conclnsion that the payments should so terminate, based
either on an express provision to that effect or inferred ft·orn
the provisions of the agreement as a whole, docs not conflict
with the concl1tsion that it is an integrated bargain and that
the payments are not otherwise subject to modification."
(Emphasis added.) Then we come to the illogical summation that ''Since the agreement in the present ease dealt
primarily with support rights and the payments were described as for support and maintenance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the
payments should continue for plaintiff's benefit after the
obligation to support the children had terminated (see Anderson v. Mart, stlpm, 47 Cal.2d 274, 283, and eases cited) and
the obligation of plaintiff's support had been assumed by her
second husband"! In the Anderson case the provisions were
also for support and maintenance, and furthermore, a majority of this court has heretofore held that the labels adopted
by the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling
that the monthly payments for support have some of the
indicia of alimony (Jiesscngct· v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619,
625, 626 [297 P.2d 988], Dc.Ttcr v. Dexte1·, 42 Cal.2d 36 [265
P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881] ).
Much has been said by a majority of this court in earlier
cases about the character of the payments in a property
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settlement agreement beiug one of fad for the trial court
in a modifi<·ation proceeding. However a majority has also
held proper the aeticm of a trial court refnsing the admission
of evidence on that poill t ( De.TI er v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36
1265 P.2d 873], and see my ronenrring and dissenting opinion
1~t pages 44, 45). In the Awlerson ease the trial court determined that the monthly payments >vcre an integrated and
inseparable part of the property settlement agr<,ement and
that the obligation for such payments did not terminate
on the death of the payor since no provision for termination
had b<•en agre(•<1 to by the parties. A ma;jo1'ity of thir,: eonrt
affirmed the jndgment ill that respect. Here the trial court
found that the remarriage of the wife and majority of the
ehildrr~11 terminated tlw obligation for the monthly payments
PYen though 110 provision for termination \Yas to he found iu
the agreement eut0red into by the parties. A majority of
this eourt affirms the aetiotl of the trial eourt but not on the
theory that there was sufficient evidence to support the conelusion of the trial court on an issne of faet. 'fhe exact
theory on whieh the majority <~onelnsion is based is not
stated. It wonld appear from reading the opinion that the
opposite conclusion was to be reached since it is held that
the monthly payments were an integrated, inseparable part
of the property settlement agreement which contained no
provision for termi!lation on remarriage of the wife or death
of the payor. It appears to me that the conclusion is inescapable that neither Anderson v. Mart nor Messenger v.
1lf cssenger is in ''accord'' with the holding here as the majority assnres us they are, but that they are directly contra
to both the reasoning and conclusion of the majority here.
'fhe majority seems to have seeedecl from its position that
the charaetrr of the payments in a property settlement agreement is a question of faet for the trier of fact. It is apparent
from the majority holdings in the recent cases of Dexter· Y.
Dexter, 42 Ca1.2c1 :36 [265 P.2d 873], Fo.r. v. Fo.x, 42 Cal.2d
49 [265 P.2d 881], Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55 [265 P.2d
86;51, Mcsscnurr v. JJfessr:nr;cr, 4G Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988].
Ande1·son v. ilfart, 47 Cal.2d 274 [803 P.2rl 5391, and the
ease at bar that the eharac~ter of the payments for support
and maintenanee in a property settlement agreement is a
q1wstion for this court to clr:termine as it sees fit without
reference to either the determination of the trial court or other
standard based upon logic or precedent. Until such time
as a majority of this court sees fit to clarify its position with
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respect to the contractual rights of the
and announces
a standard based upon sound precedent, the statement in my
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Flynn case that the
law in this field constitutes an effective trap designed to catch
both wary and unwary attorneys who are trying honestly and
conscientiously to
their clients' interests is more
applicable now than it was then. The untold confusion
existing in the law in this field as the result of the conflicting
decisions of this court is also a trap for trial and appellate
judges who are honestly endeavoring to do their duty in deciding cases of this character. This court could, by employing
a simple process of logic and reason, so clarify the law in these
cases that lawyers and trial judges would know how to dispose of them properly and thus relieve this court of at least
a portion of its already tremendous work load.
I adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and dissenting opinions in the Fox, Dexter, Flynn, Messenger and
Anderson cases, and it is my considered opinion that if and
when the majority of this court adopts these views the confusion which now exists in this field of law will be obviated
and the burden now cast upon the courts in disposing of these
cases will be greatly reduced.
There may be cases where, in the settlement of property
rights upon the dissolution of a marriage, that one spouse receives a larger share of the community property and agrees
to pay the other cash in lieu thereof. In such a case the
agreement should provide for the amount to be paid and the
time of payment. It is obvious that such payments should
not terminate upon the death of the payor or the remarriage
of the payee. But in cases such as this and .Anderson v.
Mart, supra, where it appears that the payments are for support and maintenance, and no provision is made for their
termination, they should, as a matter of law, terminate upon
the death of the payor or the remarriage of the payee.
The trial court determined here that the provision for
monthly payments was intended by the parties as support and
maintenance for the wife and children and that such payments were intended to terminate upon the remarriage of the
wife and the attainment of majority by the children. A reading of the record discloses ample evidence to sustain this
determination and it should, therefore, be affirmed.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in
the judgment insofar as it affirms the order of the trial court.
The evidence in this case, as I view it, supports and estab-
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legally tenable ground for all essential findings and conelusions of the trial court and for that reason I would affirm
its order in all respe(:ts. Also I would prefer that the majority
had expressly overruled rather than attempted to distinguish
v. JJlesscngcr (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988],
alld A11dcrson v. Jlart (1D3G), 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539],
in the respects as to which each appears to assert and rely on
doctrine inconsistent with the holding of the majority today.
Shenk, J., concurred.

[Ct'im. No. !5881.
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THE PiilOP!JE, Hespomlent, v. ,JOHN HACKLEY DAVIS
et al., Appellants.
11] Witnesses-Credibility-Disregarding Part of Testimony of
Witness.-'l'he jury may accept a portion of the testimony
of a witness and disbelieve the remainder.
[2] Homicide-Appeal-Review of Evidence-Inherent Improbability.--The testimony of a 16-year-old son of one defendant,
as a prosecution witness in a first degree murder case, that
he had been out with defendants on the night in question,
that defendants had gone into a liquor store about midnight,
and that after he and his father returned horne he overheard
his father tell a woman that he and another defendant had
gone into the store for the purpose of cashing checks, that the
clerk "didn't go for it" and they decided to rob him, and that
the other defendant then pulled a gun and shot the clerk in
the month was not inherently improbable and it was for the
jury to determine its weight, but in view of the facts that
sueh tllstimony was conflicting with that of other witnesses,
and that the witness expressed a desire to change his testimony

McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 296; [2] Homicide,
§ 249; [3] SParches and Seizures, § 1; [ 4, 6] Criminal Law, § 453;
Criminal Law, §§ 453, 457; [7] Criminal Law, § 453(1); [8]
Criminal Law,§ 4!53(1), 4:33(6); [9] Witnesses,§ 253; [10] Homieide, § 185; [11] Homicide, § 195; [12] Criminal Law, § 821; [13]
Crimina] Law, § 456: [14] Homiride, § 175; [15] Homicide, ~ 188;
[16] Homicide, § 2:36; Criminal Law, § 632; [17] Criminal Law,
~ 23"'1Jl): [181 Criminal Law, § 613; [19] Criminal Law, § 202;
[20] Attorneys, § 61; [21] Attorneys, § 27; [22] Criminal Law,
~§637, 6:18(1); [23] Criminal Law, §fi89; [24] Criminal Law,
§ 617; [25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12).

